Two costs, one root
The Coordination Tax covered in the first chapter is the cost of how a firm spends its hours.1
The People Paradox, covered here, is the cost of how a firm fails to scale past its best people.
The two share a root cause, which is the absence of operational infrastructure. They land on different surfaces. The Coordination Tax shows up in the calendar: the IC memo that took three weeks, the quarterly report that took the better part of three weeks, the wire that did not clear because the bank account was not opened. It is a time problem. The People Paradox shows up in the org chart: the one analyst who knows where the data is, the one asset manager who can answer the LP question, the one CEO whose judgment has not been codified anywhere outside his head. That one constrains growth.
A firm can pay the Coordination Tax and grow. Slowly, expensively, but it can grow. A firm cannot scale through the People Paradox. Past a certain size the best people become the ceiling. The firm tops out at the productive capacity of three or four critical individuals, and the next hire produces a fraction of the leverage the headcount math implies.
Marcus's quarterly report problem in Chapter 1 is the Coordination Tax in concrete form. Marcus's Priya problem, which this chapter walks into, is the People Paradox.
The archeologist at the analyst's desk
The Thursday before the data room request landed, Marcus stayed late.
Priya Atmani, the firm's investment associate, was the first person Marcus had hired who made him feel like the firm had crossed a threshold. She came from a $14 billion New York real estate private equity firm where she had spent three years as an acquisitions analyst out of undergrad. There, the quarterly reporting ran on rails and the IC process came with templates. The systems recorded decisions as a side effect of the work passing through them. Priya was twenty-seven when she joined Chen Capital, fresh out of her full-time MBA at UT Austin. She had worked long enough at the New York shop to be fluent in how an institutional platform operates, but short enough that she had only ever worked inside one kind of system, and so could not name what she had been given. When she walked into Marcus's firm, she fitted herself to how things worked. Marcus had recruited her for eighteen months. When she accepted, he told his partners that Priya would change the firm's trajectory.
Fourteen months later, it was 8:15 on a Thursday evening. Marcus was walking past the open office on his way out. Priya was still at her desk. Both monitors lit. Three browser tabs, two Excel files, a Word document. The configuration of someone stitching a report together by hand.
He stopped at her doorway.
"Walk me through what you're working on."
She looked up. "Quarterly. Fund II. The waterfall slide's the worst of it. There's an old version somewhere in the drive, but the cap structure changed last quarter and I can't tell which version has it. So I'm rebuilding it. Again."
"How long have you been on it tonight?"
"Since six."
Marcus paused. "How long was it at your old firm?"
She thought for a beat. "We didn't really do quarterlies there, not the way you mean. It assembled itself, mostly. A script ran Sunday nights, the data flowed in, and Monday morning IR had a draft to mark up and sign off. Two days, ten funds, plus the separate accounts." She caught her own phrasing. "Sorry. That sounded like complaining."
"No," Marcus said. "Tell me more."
"It was like that for everything. IC memos had templates that loaded the deal data already mapped. Decision logs wrote themselves. I never thought about where they came from until there wasn't one. When I joined here I figured every smaller firm just did it your way." She gestured at her monitors. "It's a different kind of work."
Marcus nodded once and let her go back to it. He took the elevator down without opening his laptop again.
Fifteen meetings, one source of truth
Tuesday, 8:30 PM. Marcus pulled up the calendar view on his laptop and ran the week side by side. Twelve meetings on his own. Eight of them with Priya. Her calendar carried nineteen in the same window. Two with LPs, one IC, one closing call. Fifteen internal meetings where she was the source of truth for something nobody had written down.
He scrolled to the shared drive and opened the Fund II LP reporting folder. Eight quarterly packages. Different file names. Different structures. Each one Priya had assembled alone.
He opened a draft message to her for Wednesday. Walk me through how much of your week is excavation. He stopped typing. He already knew the answer. The firm had hired an analyst and had been running her as an archeologist.
He closed the laptop and left the draft unsent.
His phone vibrated on the desk.
you OK? Family Office just checked in on next steps and I haven't heard a word from you.
Sarah Kessler (capital markets advisor), from a car somewhere. He typed back.
Working on it. See you at 7.
That was the end of the exchange. The relationship was the kind where a handful of words covered what other relationships needed thirty minutes for.
Genius priced as assembly
Priya was still pulling occupancy data from the property management platform for the quarterly report. The system produced a PDF organized by property and month. What the report needed was a portfolio-level summary organized by investment thesis, vintage year, trailing-twelve-month NOI against original underwriting.
No system in the firm could produce that view. Priya assembled it from memory every quarter.
The quarterly ritual: export from one system, reformat in Excel, cross-reference against the underwriting model, write narrative in Word, assemble into presentation.
Four quarters a year. Priya had clocked it twice out of curiosity: thirty-seven hours one quarter, forty-four the next, and neither was a clean measurement because the assembly bled into evenings nobody logged. Maybe two of those hours, either quarter, were analytical judgment. The rest was mechanical assembly.
Priya was the system because the firm had never built one. The assembly ran on her institutional knowledge, which is also why she could not be replaced and why the work queued up behind her.
This is the People Paradox. The more capable the person, the more the system leans on them for work that does not require their capability. That dependence crowds out the high-judgment work, so the firm collects a shrinking share of the capability it is paying for.
Because the capable person is always visibly productive, always essential to the next deadline, the CEO reads the constraint as a staffing gap and starts drafting a job listing, while the constraint itself sits in the architecture. The pattern is not particular to capital-intensive firms. Practitioners who systemize small teams report the same finding from the other end of the scale: the failure an owner reads as a staffing problem is, far more often, a defect in the process the staff were handed.2
I have watched or led the asset manager role at close range across four firms. The asset manager is hired to balance maximizing operating income, property value, and distributions. In practice, most of the week disappears into the goo in the system: cascading administrative work created by upstream handoffs that did not happen cleanly.
An LP asks when their K-1 will arrive. The asset manager cannot answer because accounting is waiting on a property report, because the property report is waiting on a sponsor response. Three emails to chase three different people, no time left for the trailing-twelve-month NOI on any single property.
An IR associate at a $1.8 billion fund had internalized the pattern completely. Her role was LP relationship management. What she actually did was build quarterly briefs by hand. Six hours per brief, sometimes seven when a fund had a distribution to explain. Ten limited partners. Four quarters a year. Two hundred and fifty-odd hours of annual capacity routed into manual reconciliation: pulling distributions, cross-referencing positions, formatting charts, assembling narrative, writing the transmittal email.
The work was necessary. It was also the ceiling of her role. When the firm later built a platform that automated brief production, the per-brief time dropped to about ninety minutes. Most of two hundred hours came back for LP cultivation: partner dinners, strategic calls about follow-on fund interest, deepening existing relationships.
The reclaimed capacity was the first moment the firm saw what she was actually capable of doing.
The career cost
The cost reaches beyond wasted hours into wasted career development. Every hour Priya spent reformatting quarterly data was an hour she was not building the pattern recognition that turns a good analyst into a great one.
44% of portfolio company leaders report a higher risk of losing top performers.
Source: AlixPartners, Eleventh Annual Private Equity Leadership Survey (2026)
The best people leave because they are under-utilized, and the ones who stay stop bringing their full judgment to the room.
Hold periods have extended; every deal now generates more operational quarters than it did five years ago. The Coordination Tax per deal grows linearly with hold period. The team holds flat.
Why hiring does not solve it
An eighth person on a seven-person team running manual processes does not produce an eighth more output. In my experience, the eighth hire adds the headcount and the coordination complexity while contributing only a sliver of net new productive work.
Every new hire forces an apprenticeship the firm has never built. At firms without codified intelligence, the new hire walks into an absence and faces a political archaeology on top of the learning curve.
One CEO I advised brought in a capable associate to run underwriting. What he discovered in his first weeks was that underwriting lived as a series of judgments the CEO made in context, communicated verbally, adjusted in hallway conversations. The criteria existed nowhere on paper. They existed in the way different partners reacted to different deals.
He went looking for a decision log: a single artifact answering who decided what, based on what evidence, when, and with what dissent. Every firm should have one. This firm did not. He began building it himself, partly so he could do his job, partly because the artifact had to exist before his own work could become legible to anyone who came after him. Six weeks elapsed between his start date and his first substantive output. Three weeks mapping the decision topology. Three weeks convincing the partners that writing it down would make future decisions faster to repeat.
The substrate under the symptoms
Every visible problem this chapter has named (the asset manager's swamped Thursday, the IR associate's manual briefs, Priya's quarterly assembly, the senior hire spending his first weeks mapping hallways) is a symptom appearing on a surface the firm can see.
The source is somewhere else, in the operating substrate the firm has not yet built. Patch a symptom and next quarter delivers a replacement. The lasting repairs happen a level down, in the substrate.
Your COO already sees the structural gap
Claudia (CFO/COO) had been tracking this pattern for months before Marcus saw it.
She kept a running log of every operational item that escalated to senior leadership each week. On a single Monday in October, thirty-five items had crossed her desk. She sorted them into columns by who they belonged to.
Fifteen of them had no owner.
No one disputed who owned them, because no one owned them. Items that landed on Priya because Priya was closest to the data, or on Jordan because Jordan was closest to the LP, or on Nathan because Nathan had touched the deal six months ago. None of those items was in any of their job descriptions. None appeared on any scorecard.
"These fifteen items belong to a function we haven't defined," Claudia told Marcus that Wednesday. "That's why everyone's stretched. Nobody here is bad at their job. They've all just got a second one on top of it, and we've never named it."
Marcus had nodded, thanked her, and gone back to the pipeline. Claudia had filed the log and kept counting.
The second face
The fifteen unowned items carried a second diagnosis underneath the missing seats. Forty years of social psychology calls it diffusion of responsibility: the more people who could plausibly act on something, the less likely any one person does (Darley & Latané, 1968). Scale creates the disease. Every hire adds another they the team can route problems to. The analyst who spots a flawed assumption in a model but does not flag it because underwriting will catch it. The IR associate who notices a misstated figure in the quarterly letter but does not raise it because the CFO signed off. The asset manager who walks past the trash on a property tour because that is maintenance's job.
The bottleneck Priya carries is the first face of the People Paradox: the system depends on one person too much. The ownership gap Claudia tracked is the second face: the system depends on everyone, which is the same thing as depending on no one. SOPs and checklists route the work, and the gap between noticing a defect and acting on it stays open.
Here are two operating systems that do:
Disney trains every Cast Member, including executives walking the park in suits, to pick up trash on sight. It works because it is carried as identity: when everyone in the costume owns the ground the cup fell on, there is nobody left to be they.
Toyota gives every line worker an Andon cord that halts a multimillion-dollar production line the moment they spot a defect. The radical part is the norm around the cord: pulling it is an obligation, and the team leader who arrives thanks the person who pulled it.
Both patterns are properties of the operating system underneath the SOP binder. The Platform CEO's job is to engineer that at the firm's scale, to give a forty-person shop the felt ownership of a three-person founding team.
AI has added a third face to the paradox. When senior people move their drafting into private chat windows, the judgment juniors once absorbed by watching goes dark. The analyst no longer sees the managing director mark up a memo; the markup happens in a window of one. A firm can train its platform and starve its apprentices at the same time, usually without noticing it is doing either. The fix appears in Chapter 11: run the work in the open, where the corrections that improve the platform stay visible to the people who need to learn from them.
The picture before the words
He thought about Priya's Thursday night. Thirty-seven hours on the quarterly one quarter, forty-four the next, and maybe two of them analytical either time. A new analyst would not change that ratio. Within six months, they would be spending forty percent of their week on coordination overhead. He pulled up the job listing that landed Priya fourteen months ago. It codified exactly the kind of person who would walk in on day one, ask where the reporting templates were, learn within a week that the answer was "there are not any," and then figure it out. What had happened in the fourteen months since?
Priya was a bottleneck because the firm had made her the system. Remove the coordination overhead and Priya was a principal-track investor with institutional training, fourteen months of firm-specific knowledge, and judgment that would mature into something irreplaceable. What the firm needed was a platform that let the Priya it already had do the work she was hired for.
He thought about Nathan Park, head-hunted from a top competitor to run acquisitions because the firm wanted his deal instinct, then placed at a desk where most of his week went into a spreadsheet he had built himself because the CRM could not produce the view he needed.
He thought about Scott Engel, the firm's Head of Asset Management with fifteen years in the business, who had spent three weeks last quarter pulling occupancy data and reconciling it against Tom Langford's (controller) accounting output before he could write a word of the board's performance report. Both men had been hired for judgment and buried in mechanical work the firm had never built the architecture to absorb. And underneath both, the quieter cost Claudia had been counting for months: the items nobody picked up because everyone could have. David Kwon, the senior asset manager who ran the harder half of the portfolio under Scott, was buried the same way after nearly a decade at the firm.
He did not have the words to describe it yet, but the picture was already clear.
A question Priya had been holding
Wednesday morning. Marcus stopped by the office early on his way to the Driskill. Priya was already at her desk, which surprised him. She was reading something on her left monitor and writing notes by hand on a legal pad, which surprised him more.
"You're in early," he said.
"There's something I've been meaning to ask you for fourteen months now, give or take."
Marcus set his bag down.
"The IC memo template," she said. "The one that says what sections every memo has to carry, what the downside case has to argue, who signs off on the rent-growth comp, all of it. Is there a reason we don't have one, or did nobody ever build it?"
Marcus looked at her for a long moment.
"Nobody ever built it."
"OK." She made a note on the pad. "If I drafted one this week and showed it to you Friday, would you read it?"
"Yes."
"Good."
She turned back to her monitor. Marcus picked up his bag and walked out toward the elevator. He had twenty minutes until breakfast with Sarah. He spent the drive thinking about what he had just been handed.
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The Coordination Tax framing is the work of Nate B. Jones (Nate's Newsletter, natesnewsletter.substack.com; AI News & Strategy Daily with Nate B. Jones), who articulated it as the organizational overhead (meetings, sprint planning, status updates, PRDs, handoff documents) that exists because the execution layer is made of humans. Jones's argument is that this tax is invisible because we experience the coordination activity as the role rather than as overhead. I have adopted his framing and applied it here to the specific operating reality of a middle-market real estate private equity firm. ↩
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The reframe that a people problem is usually a process problem in disguise is not unique to institutional firms. Layla Pomper, who teaches process design to lean teams through ProcessDriven (processdriven.co), names the pattern directly: most of what an owner blames on staff turns out to be a defect in the system the staff were handed. She works far below the scale of the firms in this book, single-operator businesses and teams under thirty, which is what makes the agreement worth noting. A pattern that holds from a three-person shop to a fourteen-billion-dollar platform is structural. ↩